Abstract: This paper re-examines the dualistic view of LDC labor markets by studying the dynamics between the "formal" and "informal" sectors across a business cycle and a period of trade liberalization in Mexico, 1987Mexico, -1993. Conventional earnings comparisons, even across time, are shown to be unreliable tests for segmentation. The paper tests for, and finds, evidence of queuing to enter formal employment. However, transitions into informal employment, the size of the informal sector, and levels of mobility in all directions, are shown to be pro-cyclical. Overall, the informal sector behaves as an unregulated entrepreneurial sector, rather than the disadvantaged sector of a dualistic labor market. There is evidence for increased subcontracting over time with trade liberalization, although it is not clear that workers are worse off.
2 competition in global manufacturing, increasingly sub-contract to unprotected workers as a means of reducing costs and gaining flexibility. 3 The issue is thus particularly relevant to the debate over establishing common labor standards in regional free trade agreements.
3 See Piore and Sabel (1984) , Beneria (1989) , Portes, Castells and Benton (1989) , Portes and Schauffler (1989) , Tokman (1992) and most recently articles in Blank and Freeman (1994) . The U.S. Department of Labor has sponsored two studies on the informal sector: Workers Without Protections: Case Studies of the Informal Sector in Developing Countries (1993) and The Informal Sector in Mexico (1992) .
However, there is some support for an alternate conception that sees the lack of protection as one dimension of an unregulated, yet dynamic, sector of small scale entrepreneurs many of whom enter the sector voluntarily and who choose, and are able, to remain largely outside the formal regulatory structures. 4 Labor markets may therefore be broadly integrated, and the existence of unprotected labor is not in itself evidence of segmentation. Arguably, workers contemplating selfemployment would wait for an auspicious business climate before leaving a protected job to launch their enterprise and would be more likely to fail during a downturn, inverting the counter-cyclical patterns of entry and exit predicted by the dualistic view. As will be argued, the benefits of being informal may extend even to subcontracting relations which are generally thought to benefit only the employer.
Research on the informal sector has largely relied on case studies, or static comparisons of earnings differentials which tend to show that formal sector workers earn more given their human capital. But to date, the data have not existed to study sectoral interactions across time. This paper takes advantage of an extraordinary longitudinal data set from Mexico that permits an examination of the dynamics among the various subsectors of the labor markets from [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] . This period encompasses a complete business cycle, a far reaching trade reform, and pursuit of regional integration through NAFTA. 4 See, for example Hart (1972 ), de Soto (1989 , Tokman (1992) , Fields (1990) , Turnham and Eröcal (1990) , Portes and Shauffler (1992) .
The paper first argues that traditional earnings comparisons are not reliable measures of segmentation, even when viewed across time. It then examines movements in relative sector sizes, the role of the various sectors in generating and absorbing the unemployed, and the changing patterns of mobility among sectors across the business cycle. It also explicitly explicitly tests for queuing to enter formal sector employment. Overall, the second "entrepreneurial" view emerges as the better first approximation. The last section offers preliminary evidence on the incidence of subcontracting and its impact on worker welfare by tracking the composition of the labor force after trade liberalization in a more comprehensive way than has been possible to date.
II. Data
The Mexican case is well-suited to the study of dualism, informality, and subcontracting.
First, roughly 40% of the urban labor force works without labor protections. Second, an archaic and onerous system of labor regulation, dating back over half a century, grants little flexibility and drives up labor costs. The Constitution conceives of the employment relationship as a lifetime contract and workers may only be fired under extreme circumstances and at great cost. For their part, workers lose generous severance pay and may lose their pensions if they quit, and enjoy no unemployment insurance should they be laid off. Taken at face value, the labor code thus discourages the mobility necessary to ensure an efficient allocation of workers and jobs, and constrains employers in their management of personnel. Legally mandated non-wage compensation drives a wedge of 30-60%, substantially above those for other OECD countries. Third, the radical trade reforms beginning in 1986 and the subsequent pursuit of regional integration through NAFTA converted a relative closed economy to one competing aggressively in both import and export markets. The resulting adjustment of its labor market can offer some preliminary observations on the issue of globalization and subcontracting.
The National Urban Employment Survey (NUES) conducts extensive quarterly household interviews in the major metropolitan areas and is available from 1987 to 1993. This permits the generation of time series of relative earnings for each sector at quarterly frequency. The NUES is also structured so as to generate panels which allow tracking a fifth of each sample across five quarters. Workers are matched by position in an identified household, sex, level of education, and age to ensure against generating spurious transitions. These panels permit sketching patterns of mobility among sectors that can be tracked across the seven year period. The analysis restricts itself to men aged 16-65 with a high school education or less.
While the term "informal" suffers from overly broad and imprecise usage, it refers here to owners and workers in firms under 16 employees who do not have social security or medical benefits and are therefore not protected.
5 Four sectors of paid work are studied that include formal salaried employment and three "informal" sectors: The self-employed including owners of informal firms; the informal salaried, those working in informal firms; and contract workers, those who do not receive a regular wage or salary, but who are paid as a percentage, by piece, on commission, or fixed contract. They may be affiliated with a larger firm that provides raw materials, but work independently and are those most likely to be involved in subcontracting relations. There is also a residual "other" category (not shown) that includes firm owners who are protected, and owners and unprotected workers in firms of over 16 people. The remainder of the interviewed population (to total 100%) is divided into three classes of individuals who are not working: those out of the labor 5 There appear to be workers at larger firms who do not report having benefits, however this is stretching our idea of informality beyond the smaller scale industries usually contemplated and may, in addition, be due to measurement error. Since it is often the wife of the worker who is at home at the time of the survey, it is entirely possible that they are not informed about their husbands true employment conditions. STPS also argued that there may be some very transitory workers for large firms not covered in violation of the law.
force, not currently working and not searching; those studying; and the unemployed. 6 Movements among sectors are best captured in transition matrices that present the conditional probability of finding a worker in sector j at the end of the period given that the worker began in sector i, P ij, as well as initial and terminal sector sizes, P i. and P .j . As this would require 24 large matrices to cover the sample period, figures 1and 2 instead graphically present elements of these matrices serially. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the sectoral composition of the interviewed population P i. using the entire sample. Figure 2 plots the probability of transition into and out of the formal sector standardized by the probability that in a random reshuffling a worker would finish in the terminal sector (relative sector size) P ij /P .j . Figure 3 presents median hourly real earnings, adjusted for human capital. Using the median hourly real earnings in each sector in figure 3 , and the macro-aggregates in tables 1-3, we can divide the period 1987-1993 broadly into three phases, recession, recovery, and 7 slowdown.
Phase I: As Lustig (1992) details, 1986 and 1987 were years of deep recession surrounded by the uncertainty of the success of the stabilization and reform programs. The balance of payments crisis in mid-1985 led to extreme contractionary measures which were undermined by the 50% fall in oil prices in 1986. GDP fell by 3.8% and manufacturing wages fell another 5.9%. Before turning up again, real wages had fallen a cumulative 39% since the beginning of the crisis. As figure 3 suggests, the recession had a depressive effect on earnings through 1987, which, in all sectors, show great downward flexibility. During this period, Mexico embarked upon the first wave of dramatic trade liberalization: From 1985 to 1990, maximum import tariffs fell by 50% while import licensing fell to a quarter of previous levels. 8 The depreciated peso and depressed wages, however, initially provided some cushion of competitiveness. (1992) and Maloney and Azevedo (1996) 12 In February 1988, the government effectively froze public prices and the exchange rate, and minimum wages were raised 3% then fixed. For its part, the private sector committed to not raising prices.
with the tightening labor market, especially in the self-employed and contract sectors where they rose over 30%. In 1990, the government initiated discussions of a free trade agreement with the United States.
Phase III: The economy began to soften from 1992-1993 with growth rates slowing dramatically to .45% in 1993, sustained only by continued growth in the non-manufacturing sectors.
The official measure of unemployment again rose to 3.4% as manufacturing shed workers and job creation in the construction and commerce sectors slowed. Earnings in all informal sectors declined in absolute terms and relative to formal sector wages which stagnated.
The next two sections test the competing hypotheses outlined previously by examining first, the behavior of earnings differentials and second, patterns of mobility across the period. Second, the similarity of the behavior of contract worker earnings suggests that these two sectors are closely related. Third, informal salaried workers appear to receive consistently less than the formal sector wage.
IV. Relative Earnings Movements and Segmentation.
The literature on dualism has relied almost exclusively on these kinds of cross-sectoral earnings comparisons, finding higher formal sector earnings to be evidence of segmentation. 13 However, the interpretation of earnings differentials cannot be this straightforward since the specific 13 See Rosenzweig (1988) . Somewhat unusually, Marcouiller, Ruiz, and Woodruff (1994) find higher mean earnings in the Mexican informal sector than the formal. characteristics of work that pertain to or even define the formal and informal sectors affect earnings in each sector and make it unclear what the magnitude or sign of the differential should be even in an unsegmented market. In a market with no distortions, earnings in the informal sector should rise above that in the formal sector to compensate for the expected value of benefits received by formal sector workers. Similarly, formal sector workers would require compensation for taxation which informal sector workers may often avoid. Formal salaried work and informal self-employment may also differ in hours worked, degree of risk taken, degree of independence, and costs of capital invested that may further drive a wedge between reported earnings. Informal salaried workers are frequently young and related to informal entrepreneurs and thus their earnings may be net of training costs or unobserved payments in kind. In the absence of information on these factors, the magnitude of the distortion-free differential cannot be known a priori and the interpretation of the raw earnings differentials reported in previous studies as evidence of segmentation becomes less clear.
In fact, it is arguable that the customary strategy of establishing segmentation by observing earnings differentials should be inverted. There is some reason to believe that Phase II represents a period absent of segmentation: As Bell (1994) and Davila (1996) have argued, the minimum wage was not binding and the historically low unemployment rates were held by Lustig to be the result of extraordinary downward flexibility in (formal sector) wages. It may therefore be reasonable to consider the observed differentials in figure 3 as reference values for unsegmented markets that account for all the effects detailed above. If this is the case, the assumption that a differential of zero represents an unsegmented market underlying many previous studies is probably unjustified.
There is, however, substantial variance in differentials across the period. Earnings in the closest substitute to formal salaried work, informal salaried work, rise from being a minimum of 69% of formal salaried wages in 1988:1 to a maximum of 83% in 1990:3 before falling to 77% in 1993:4.
It might be argued that if the value of the unobserved arguments remains constant over time that the initial narrowing of 14% represents evidence in support of the dualistic view: In a downturn, displaced formal sector workers compete in the informal sector thereby expanding the differential between rigid formal sector and market clearing informal sector earnings. But, it could also be argued that since the Pact was intended as a means of moderating salary increases, it capped them below market clearing during phase II yielding a premium to working in the unregulated sectors whose earnings would not have been affected.
The relative movements may also reflect the existence of skills or capital that are sector specific over the short run, without necessarily implying inferiority of a particular sector. Earnings of an informal skilled carpenter working on his own would rise dramatically in phase II with the increase in construction activity. Installed capital in a workshop or small store may also lead to selfemployed workers preferring to earn subnormal profits in a recession if there is an expectation that in an upturn there will be supernormal profits. The reverse may also be true. A worker with substantial firm specific capital, or as Lucas (1978) postulated, little entrepreneurial ability, may ride out a wage stagnation in the formal sector should he doubt that he would earn more as a small businessman over the long run.
In sum, neither the absolute levels of differentials, nor their movement across time yield conclusive evidence in favor of either the dualistic or integrative hypotheses.
V. Sectoral Behavior and Patterns of Transition.
However, the evolution of sector sizes and the patterns of worker mobility offers can. While offering some support to the standard dualistic view, the evidence strongly suggests that the informal sector may be a desirable destination for many workers. To begin, figure 1 shows that informal selfemployment attains its maximum share of the work force at the peak of the recovery in 1990.
Informal salaried employment, while less dramatic, also locally peaks in 1990. The lag behind selfemployment may be due to small firms hiring only after being established for a period. Contrary to the bulk of the literature on informality, it is the informal sector that is expanding as unemployment falls and growth picks up, while formal sector employment falls. Contract work shows an initial rise after moving out the recession, but overall behaves counter-cyclically as the dualistic view would suggest. However, until 1991, it also broadly tracks movements in formal sector employment, whose employment share also behaves counter-cyclically until 1991. The similarity of the behavior of contract and self-employed earnings suggests that both may represent equally successful types of entrepreneurship, but serve different clientele: contract workers with larger formal sector firms, the self-employed with a distinct market, perhaps more oriented toward services or smaller customers.
The non-work sectors also show strong cyclical behavior. Unemployment reaches its minimum at the height of the expansion in 1990. Being out of the labor force appears to be a luxury, rather than the repository of discouraged workers, increasing as unemployment falls, and falling again as the economy worsens. The share of the labor force working as unpaid workers also behaves counter-cyclically suggesting that this subsector, roughly 2% of the workforce, may function as a safety net: when the economy worsens, perhaps paid family members, or those out of the labor force, work for free. There is no obvious explanation for the secular decline in the share of those in school.
Second, the transition probabilities standardized by terminal sector size (P ij /P .j ) suggest that the increase in activity leads to greater, and relatively symmetrical, mobility between the formal and informal sectors. Mobility between formal salaried workers and the self-employed both rise as the economy strengthens going into 1990, but transitions into self-employment overall seem to rise more than the reverse (figure 2). The patterns of mobility are somewhat more obscure between the formal salaried sector and the informal salaried and contract sectors. In the latter, there are broadly symmetrical rises in movements between sectors going into the upturn although movements into contract work become relatively more "fluid" after 1990 than the reverse transitions that dominated earlier. Movements between formal and informal salaried work, again, heighten in both directions in 1990 although any symmetries are less easy to detect. Overall, rather than a unidirectional flow back into formal sector employment with economic recovery, there appears to be accelerated rematching across all sectors, although, again, most clearly between the self-employed and formal sectors.
Finally, statistical correlations of intersectoral mobility and unemployment do not suggest that the primary function of the informal sector is to absorb displaced labor during downturns, although they do provide some evidence of rationing. The coefficients in table 4 are those from the standard exponential form of a multinomial logit.
where the vector ß j measures the degree to which an increase in open unemployment (µ) increases the probability of a worker going to sector j relative to the probability of staying in sector i for all sectors.
Several findings at odds with the traditional dualistic view emerge from the table. First,
movement into unemployment rises in downturns from all sectors, both formal and informal, and, with the exception of informal salaried work, significantly. Movements out of unemployment decrease in downturns into all sectors of paid work, although significantly only for the formal salaried, and almost at the 10% level for the informal salaried. Both findings suggest that, contrary to the dualistic hypothesis, you can "lose" a job in the informal sector and it is not obviously easier to find informal work in a downturn. The one anomaly is informal salaried work where from OLF, school, and unpaid work, there is evidence of counter-cyclical entry, although only significantly from OLF.
Looking at transitions within paid work, several relations are also striking. First, while it is true that movements into formal salaried work fall as unemployment rises from every sector, this is also true for self-employment, confirming the procyclical behavior of sector size found earlier. Only for the transition from formal salaried to contract work is there a significant positive coefficient.
Even informal salaried work shows a lower probability of entering from self-employment, and only a very insignificant positive relationship from formal salaried employment. Combined with the previous finding that all sectors contribute to unemployment, it is difficult to sustain the view that overall, the informal sectors are the safety net absorbing dismissed formal sector labor.
The increased relative movement from both school and OLF into unemployment suggests that, as much as workers losing positions, unemployment is comprised of those in school and OLF who begin to search for employment to augment their family incomes. This motivation would also explain why, from every sector, except OLF, workers are less likely to return to school, significantly so for the unemployed, unpaid, self-employed and informal salaried. The results are consistent with the findings of Revenga and Riboud (1993) who argue that most labor market adjustments in Mexico occur through dramatic falls in earnings in all sectors and thus relatively little labor is actually shed.
However, the fall in real incomes does drive those out of the labor force to actively seek other sources of income, thereby driving up unemployment.
Is there evidence of queuing?
Although the logit specification captures gross tendencies during cyclical downturns for movements among the four modes of work, we can test explicitly for rationing by recasting Abowd and Farber's (1982) test for union-induced segmentation in a time series context.
14 At a given moment in time, a worker in current sector "c" will desire to switch to an alternate sector "a" if he expects a gain in utility which is a function both of earnings and of non-wage benefits of working in the sector such as those discussed in section IV. Since many of these factors--independence, medical insurance, or other labor protections--are not pegged to the wages, these effects are assumed to be constant across time leaving the differential rates of growth of sectoral earnings as determining the relative desirability of each sector. Together, the desire to enter the alternate sector is
Where ?F ac is the unchanging utility arising from differing non-wage benefits between sectors and W a , W c hat are the forecasted values from the standard Mincerian earning equation 14 See Dickens and Lang (1985) for an alternate test of queuing using endogenous switching models.
where X is a vector of worker characteristics. This permits proxying for unobserved earnings in the alternate sector and avoiding bias in the estimates of a c . 15 The time subscript on ß reflects the fact that across time similar worker characteristics may lead to different earnings in each sector. This may result from any number of other structural or temporal factors including the level of economic activity.
This equation, however, yields only the unobserved desire to move, which may be thwarted by any factor causing queuing or that affects the probability of being offered a job in the new sector once it is desired to seek it. Since the unemployed are by definition, those looking or unable to find jobs, this probability of being offered a job is a function of the state of the labor market, µ.
Particularly during cyclical downturns, the informal sector is generally posited to serve as the reserve army of those unable, although willing, to take a job in the formal sector. The unobserved latent variable, Y 2 determines whether or not a worker is selected from the queue, a queue which may be of zero length in a period of high economic activity. The probability that an individual will be observed in, for example, the alternate sector is the probability that the worker desires to work in that sector (is in the queue) and is selected:
15 Replacing only the unobserved alternate wage with the forecasted variable, but using the realized current wage has the potential to bias alpha since e a is likely to be correlated with W c . is assumed to have the same effect as a one percent decline in initial earnings. In no case, however, does the likelihood suggest that the constrained regression is a better specification than the unconstrained.
As expected, from every sector, the probability of entering the formal sector rises with the formal sector wage and significantly so (with the exception of contract work), and falls with the rise in initial sector earnings, although never significantly. From all other sectors, the cyclical variable enters significantly and negatively in at least one of the two specifications. This suggests that there is queuing to enter the formal sector that is exacerbated in cyclical downturns.
However, the previous findings of pro-cyclical movements into self-employment are also preserved although their decreased significance suggests that much of the negative correlation with unemployment was due to the large accompanying relative earnings movements shown in figure 3:
in a downturn, the returns to self-employment falls and fewer workers want to move. The still significant coefficient from salaried informal employment does offer evidence of barriers to entering 17 See, for example, Assaad (19950. Turnham and Eröcal (1990) argue "... Perhaps it may not be too far-fetched in most cases to suppose that the condition of being unemployed actually signifies an inability to operate as an entrepreneur or to gain access via a family connection [to self-employment. To the extent that this is true, the unemployed are, in self-employment.
effect, only competing for work in the wage labor market" (p. 32).
The informal salaried sector appears to be the one sector where a strong case can be made for the traditional view of the role of the informality. Rationing appears entering both the selfemployed and the salaried formal sector, and it is the only sector for which a significant positive sign appears on the cyclical variable when entering from formal salaried employment. While the interpretation in a queuing context is not obvious, the results do suggest that the sector may absorb labor shed from formal employment.
V. Why Might Workers Prefer Informality?
Taken together, the data is suggestive of a heterogeneous informal sector. That there is evidence of queuing to enter the formal sector suggests that some fraction of the sector serves as a reserve sector as traditionally conceived. But the fact that self-employment overall is procyclical in size, and in probability of entering from all other sectors, suggests that this, the largest segment of informality constituting 25% of paid work, is best thought of as a desirable destination sector in itself.
This conclusion is consonant with Gregory's finding, analyzing less comprehensive data from , that the Mexican labor market is reasonably well integrated.
There may be two overarching reasons that workers may prefer informal jobs, particularly self-employment despite the ostensibly large benefits of being formally employed.
First, the inefficiencies and rigidities in formal sector regulations affect workers' demand for formal employment as well as formal firms' demand for labor. This is particularly the case in the absence of a binding minimum wage where, as discussed before, overall remuneration must be equal across sectors, but the costs of non-wage benefits is implicitly paid by workers through lower wage remuneration. Should the value of benefits to the worker fall below the implicit tax, it would be preferable to move into an informal sector where payment is entirely monetary. And, a key difference between LDCs and industrialized countries is that incomplete regulation of the labor market and small firm sector gives some entrepreneurs and employees exactly this choice of how to receive payment.
Several possible sources of such a wedge appear both in the nature of the labor protections system and in interviews with workers. First, since an entire family is covered by medical benefits, when any one member is formally employed, the marginal value of benefits to the second formal sector worker is zero. Second, the quality of many services is often poor and administrative overhead costs are very high causing some workers to see mandatory contributions to benefits programs as a disadvantage of formal salaried work . 18 Third, leaving formal sector employment voluntarily may not necessarily imply the loss of large separation benefits since, as Balán et al (1973) argue, many workers are not in a particular job long enough to accumulate much seniority.
This view is plausibly consistent with the differentials observed in figure 3 . The roughly 30% premium of self-employment and contract earnings over formal salaried wages, although still including the value of lifestyle and risk premia, and taxes, is at the low end of the estimated 30-60% in non-wage costs to firms. The persistent discount experienced by the informal salaried relative to the formal could be explained if the value of benefits and the risk of working for family members were perceived as low, and the value of avoided taxes, in kind payments, and training is high.
This logic applies to all three sectors although it is compelling only where small scale firms can offer remuneration comparable to that earned in the formal sector--among low productivity workers unlikely to generate much firm specific human capital. This gives rise to a second reason that, particularly self-employment, may be desirable. Being one's own boss is valued in the industrialized world, and there is no reason to think that developing country workers value their independence less. There is support in the extensive interviews of Monterrey workers undertaken by Balán, et al. (1973) , and increasingly elsewhere, for a "life cycle" pattern where workers enter into salaried work, accumulate knowledge, capital, and contacts, and then quit to open their own informal businesses. The low formal sector productivity and firm specific capital reduce the opportunity cost of such moves and should lead to an increased share of self-employment in total work.
VI. Trade Reform and Sub-Contracting:
In phase II, contract work is not obviously a disadvantaged sector. Figure 3 suggests that contract earnings follow the same increase relative to formal salaried wages shown by the selfemployed. Mobility between the formal and contract sectors is heightened during the upturn of phase II. It is possible that contracting exists partially as a Pareto improving way to avoid the inefficiencies in the labor legislation (or duplication of benefits coverage) discussed above, rather than to avoid the legislation per se, and that efficient workers may do better on a piece rate basis in good times than working in a factory.
19
19 Roberts'(1989) Guadalajara interviews suggest that given the very weak unions and low wages, informalization is not primarily a strategy for reducing remuneration and worker control over production: "Market uncertainty and the large number of income opportunities in the city mean that it is useful for both employees and employers to have flexibility in allocating labor."(italics added, p. 48).
However, the data after 1991 may suggest a less sanguine interpretation of increased outsourcing to reduce labor costs in the face of increased global competition. Figure 1 reveals a secular decline in the contribution of formal salaried work, from over 38% to 35% of the interviewed sample. This decline is offset by a rise in the share of contract workers and the informal salaried while the rate of transition into contract work from formal sector work now exceeds the rate of reverse transition. It is clear from figure 3 that contract earnings are falling at a more rapid rate than any other sector, suggesting that workers are not better off as a result of this trend. On the other hand, contract earnings are always the most volatile of the four series so it is not obvious that they are losing relatively more than would be the case in any previous downturn.
This evolution appears correlated with a restructuring of the manufacturing sector that is very likely related to increased external competition. Tables 2 & 3 
VII. Conclusions
The results suggest that a fraction of the informal sector conforms to the traditional dualistic conception of the unprotected worker. The narrowing of earnings differentials during economic recovery and the evidence of queuing for entry into formal salaried are consistent with a reserve sector role during downturns. Further, the behavior of the contract sector after 1990 does suggest that workers are being shifted from the protected to informal sector as a way of reducing costs, possibly with a reduction in their welfare.
However, for the bulk of the sector, informality does not imply inferior work. The largest component of the informal sector, self-employment, behaves pro-cyclically, expanding during upturns, and also shows evidence of queuing for entry. A more apt conception is that of a small scale, entrepreneurial sector, akin to those found in industrialized countries, but unregulated. This interpretation does not rule out the dualistic view dominating when minimum wages are binding far above market clearing. But where they are not, the taxes on formal workers implicit in the labor legislation, and the generally low levels of formal sector productivity, make working in an informal business a desirable alternative. Much of the informal sector may therefore represent an efficient allocation of labor that would persist even in the absence of labor market distortions.
First, if the formal sector pays benefits--pensions, health insurance, housing subsidies, day care--which the informal sector does not, the total equilibrium remuneration must remain equal but the formal sector wage w f should now fall below that in the "unprotected" sector, w i by the expected value of benefits to the workers E(b). 21 Second, income taxes, t, support public goods from which tax avoiding informal workers are not excludable, and therefore dictate that in equilibrium w f should rise above w i to compensate. Third, the number of hours worked, h, may differ between sectors. Fourth, for all classes of informal work, there may be substantial lifestyle differences, l, which would imply an additional wage differential, mrs wl * dl of undetermined sign: formal sector work places may be cleaner or safer, but, as in the industrialized world, being ones' own boss may be valued. Fifth, there may be different perceived risks of working in each sector, represented by unforeseen moves in the wage, that risk averse workers integrate in their decisions. The maximization of expected utility over possible realizations of the random variables w i and w f implies risk premia, rp (s 2 ) where s 2 is the variance of the "return," in each sector that drives a wedge between the two expected wages.
22 While anecdotal evidence from Mexico suggests that informal employment is perceived as riskier it is difficult ex-ante to sign this wedge. 23 Sixth, the reported wage of informal micro-enterprise owners does not subtract off the implicit return to capital employed, rK, and may also implicitly incorporate payments to unpaid working family members who might have earned the market wage and whose hours should be included in h.
Informal salaried workers pose additional complications. they are often related to the owners of the enterprises where they work and some degree of the observed wage segmentation may therefore be due to unobserved payments in kind (n), or to a joint familial objective function that induces considerations beyond remuneration in sectoral choice. Second, Memmer and Mannel (1989) argue: "In many countries, informal small enterprises train more apprentices and workers than the formal education system and the mostly governmental job-training schemes together."(p.1544) 24 , so that some fraction (tr) may be deducted to cover implicit training costs.
Taking these effects into account where S is the residual segmentation premium accruing to formal sector workers that in a market without distortions we would hypothesize to be zero. It is readily apparent that, in the absence of information on all of these factors, neither the sign nor the magnitude of the distortion-free differential can be known ex-ante. The interpretation of the raw wage differentials reported in previous studies thus becomes unclear, and conclusions about segmentation from the patterns in figure 1 can only be tentative.
However, the studies based on the most extensive and detailed data sets are those most recent and they present a snapshot of sectoral relations in 1991-92, a relatively prosperous time coming after several years of recovery. It was also a time where the minimum wage was extremely low and probably not binding (See Bell, (1994) and Davila in this volume, table 2). Casual interviews in 1994 revealed that a clown begging on La Reform took home two minimum wages and a taxi driver who was not owner of his vehicle took home four. Thus, the sanguine "integrated" view presented above does may not preclude institutional rigidities as being important in other periods, particularly during cyclical downturns. This chapter presents an overview of sectoral relationships across the relatively mild cyclical movements of the period 1987-1993 and focuses in detail on one period that seems particularly informative.
But it is also the case that even a forward looking indexing mechanism for formal sector wages could have pushed them above market clearing. A wage increase (w dot) mechanism based even on expected inflation (p dot e) is clear since if If the nominal exchange rate(s) and foreign tradeables prices (p*) are fixed and the Law of One Price holds rendering the tradeables sector's contribution to CPI growth (a) equal to zero, there must be a decrease in the competitiveness of the external sector.
The issue of labor productivity cannot be separated from that of human capital accumulation. Rather than an excessively rigid labor market, it is arguable that the rates of turnover observed are excessive. Low levels of firm attachment suggest little firm specific capital or long term training. To the degree that firms view the average education as suitable only for very low skill based technologies, like the maquilas, labor productivity is likely to rise slowly. An important complement to labor market reform may be upgrading the Mexican system of primary education and training.
Finally, there is support that the real exchange rate appreciation was not due to distortions in the labor market induced by the pact, but rather represent equilibrating movements in the nontradeables and often unprotected sector. This paper employs an extraordinary longitudinal data set to examine transitional labor market dynamics at the confluence of three conflicted literatures in labor and trade economics: dualism, global trade integration and labor protection, and exchange rate based stabilization.
A long tradition in the industrialized countries has asserted the existence of good and bad jobs in segmented or dualistic labor markets where workers of equal qualification receive different returns to their human capital.
25
The LDC analogue is found in the extensive literature on informality.
26 Generous formal sector benefits (severance pay, social security, medical benefits), high minimum wages, and costly regulation in general, are thought to force marginal labor costs above their market clearing level. Rationed out workers queue up for preferred jobs while subsisting in the unregulated or informal sector, characterized by an absence of benefits, irregular work conditions, high turnover and, overall, lower rates of remuneration. 27 However, an alternate literature conceives of the sector as a collection of small firms, a large fraction of which constitutes an "upper tier" of dynamic prosperous entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs may accumulate physical and human capital in the formal sector before voluntarily starting their own informal business. 28 The two conceptions lead to very different conclusions about the efficiency of the labor market, and the appropriate labor market reforms.
A second related literature studies the possible trade-offs between worker protections and labor market flexibility, particularly in the context of trade liberalization. Recent studies of both industrialized and developing countries assert that large enterprises, driven by the increasing competition in global manufactures, sub-contract production out to unprotected workers to reduce legislated or union-induced rigidities and high labor costs. 29 Yet to date, the evidence for this "Structural Articulation" or "Decentralization" view has been largely anecdotal. One more comprehensive data set (see Maloney 1996) suggests that some sub-contracting can be seen as a Pareto improving trade between employers and self-employed workers to evade the inefficiencies in labor legislation, rather than an exploitive roll-back of worker protections. This issue of subcontracting in LDCs is particularly relevant to the debate over establishing common labor standards in regional agreements such as NAFTA: whatever safeguards may exist in paper, foreign firms can employ an effectively unprotected work force to compete with U.S or other first world industries. 30 25 For an overview see Dickens (1990) . 26 See Peattie (1987), Fields (1990) , Turnham & Eröcal (1990) , Tokman (1992) , Portes and Schauffler, (1993) for excellent overviews. 27 The Harris-Todaro (1970) model is perhaps the traditional statement of this view. See most recently Chandra and Khan 1992 , Chandra 1994 , Loayza 1994 .An alternate view within the segmentation literature sees dualism as arising endogenously from efficiency wage type considerations that induce larger firms to pay remuneration above market clearing (see Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani, 1989) . Behar (1988) and Ros and Marquez (1990) find that in Mexico, as is the case in the U.S., wages increase with firm size and further, large firms often pay benefits substantially above those established by law. 28 See, for example Hart (1972 ), de Soto(1989 , Tokman (1989 Tokman ( , 1992 Fields (1990) , Turnham and Eröcal (1990) , Portes and Shauffler (1992) . Levenson and Maloney (1996) have argued that the sector is more analogous to the selfemployed sector of industrialized countries than the disadvantaged sector of a segmented market. 29 See most recently Blank and Freeman (1994) especially Lemieux and de la Rica on the impact of health insurance policies in the U.S. and Spain. See Beneria 1989 , Portes, Castells and Benton 1989 , Portes and Schauffler 1989 , and Roberts 1989 in the Structural Articulation school. Piore and Sabel, 1987, Gordon, Edwards and Reich, 1983 , more generally in the decentralization school. See also Tokman (1992) .
Third, the recurring overvaluations that undermine exchange rate based stabilization programs are often attributed to labor market distortions, in particular, the backward indexation of wages. 31 However, an another literature argues that these exchange rate movements are not "inertial" but "equilibrium" in nature and stress understanding consumption and investment decisions in the context of reform as critical to successful stabilizations in the future.
The Mexican case offers an excellent case study for these issues that offers insights for both other OECD and developing countries:
Institutionally, it is well-suited to the study of dualism and the relationship between worker protections and flexibility. An archaic and onerous system of labor regulation, dating back seventy years, on paper, grants little flexibility and drives up labor costs. The Constitution conceives of the employment relationship as a lifetime contract and workers may only be fired under extreme circumstances and at great cost. For their part, workers lose generous severance pay and may lose their pensions if they quit and enjoy no unemployment insurance should they be laid off. Taken at face value, the labor code thus discourages the mobility necessary to ensure an efficient allocation of workers and jobs, and constrains employers in their management of personnel. Legally mandated nonwage compensation drives a wedge of 30-60%, substantially above those for other OECD countries. The share of the urban labor force working "informally" is estimated at around 40%.
Second, the radical trade reforms beginning in 1986 and the subsequent pursuit of regional integration through NAFTA converted a relative closed economy to one competing aggressively in both import and export markets. The resulting adjustment of its labor market can shed light on the issue of globalization and subcontracting both north and south of the Rio Grande. In addition, Mexico is an archetypal competitive low wage economy that is thought to pose a threat to U.S. industry.
Third, the collapse of the lauded Mexican experiment in December of 1994 is being debated as an object lesson in the failure of exchange rate based stabilization programs.
Finally, a comprehensive longitudinal data set spanning 1987-1993 permits studying transitional dynamics among the various sub-markets across a period that encompasses a complete business cycle, the trade reform and pursuit of regional integration through NAFTA, and the prelude to crisis. This temporal dimension offers a fresh approach to studying the role of the informal sector and labor market rigidities, one with clear analogies to the extensive literature in the U.S. on the determinants of worker mobility and particularly to the impact of unionism on job mobility. 32 It also permits tracing the changing composition of the labor force after trade liberalization in a more systematic and comprehensive way than has been possible to date. Finally, by comparing the behavior of unprotected and protected wages, the data permit some quantification of the degree to which labor market distortions were responsible for the revaluation of the Mexican peso in the pre-crisis period. 31 See Edwards and Cox Edwards (1991) for Chile from 1979-1982, Dornbusch and Werner (199?) more recently for Mexico. 32 See for example, Parsons (1972), Topel and Ward(1992) For the impact of trade unions on turnover see for example, Farber (1980) and Freeman (1984) .
Annex I presents the differentials corresponding to transitions discussed above: Figure A1 presents the growth in real hourly wages of those who remain in the initial sector; Figures A2-A4 present differentials arising from movements between the three sectors and formal salaried work as well as the evolution of wages of those who remained in the initial and destination sectors. s rich in information and here we focus only on dynamics in and out of unemployment. Counterintuively, movements into unemployment are positively correlated with rises in unemployment significantly for only two sectors, OLF and School, and insignificantly for informal salaried. The coefficient is negative from all other sectors of work, and significantly so for the formal salaried. This suggests a view of unemployment that may partially explain the low rates that Mexico shows, even during deep crises. The rise in unemployment seems less due to people losing their jobs, than to those in school or out of the labor force beginning to search for jobs. The formal salaried are in fact less likely to become unemployed suggesting that voluntary separations are reduced in hard times. The movements out of unemployment are also counter-intuitively signed. Transitions into the informal sectors decrease with unemployment (although insignificantly) suggesting that, contrary to the safety net hypothesis, it may be harder to get informal work in a downturn. The only significant positive relations are found moving into School, reflecting perhaps young job seekers who take the opportunity to build capital, and again, counter-intuitively, the formal sector.
These results may have some foundation in Revenga and Ribaud (1993) who argue that unemployment is essentially a luxury affordable only by those relatively better off. An economic downturn may drive those not searching hard or in school to look for jobs, and hence become "unemployed" to support their families, thus generating the unusual procyclical movements in the fraction of those out of the labor force observed. But those who would consider self-employment, informal salaried employment, or contract work as viable options may not enjoy that luxury.
d 2. Transitions among Paid Sectors
Two specifications are presented in tables 5 for each initial sector. The first column of each subpanel includes the partially observed bivariate probit, with the unemployment rate and fitted initial and alternate wages as regressors, the latter with their coefficients left unconstrained. In several cases, however, the coefficients on the initial and alternate wages are very asymmetrical and there appears to be covariance between one of the wage variables and the cyclical variable.
Movements Out of the Formal sector: The Informal Sector as Safety Net?
The multinomial logit regressions suggest a consistent pattern of sign reversal across income level moving from formal salaried work into every other paid sector. The better-off are less likely to move and the worse-off more likely to move as unemployment rises. This suggests a "safety net" interpretation of informality for the lower tier, but an "entrepreneurial" view of the sector for the upper, where workers wait for a more auspicious time to open their business, or to join such a business. In fact, a further breakdown by quartiles shows that the countercyclical movements are restricted largely to the bottom quartile while all other strata move out of formal sector employment as the economy improves.
These findings are largely preserved in the probit and POBP regressions. Movements into self-employment show broadly the predicted and symmetrical signs on wages, and opposing signs on unemployment by stratum entering at most at the 10% level. Movements into informal salaried work show reasonable, if asymmetric signs on wages and surprisingly, strong evidence of rationing entering the sector, both for the entire sample and for the upper tier. Only in the constrained regressions is there evidence of the countercyclical movements that are assumed in the literature to dominate, again, among the less well-off. In this case, the constraint is extremely important to the results and there is no obvious way to distinguish between the constrained and unconstrained models. However, the movements from the other sectors into salaried informal employment suggest that this is not an undesirable sector. The only significant coefficients on unemployment in the multinomial logit, probit and POBP regressions from self-employment are negative and, more than movements into formal salaried work, suggest queuing to enter informal salaried employment. Movements from informal salaried work into self-employment and contract work are significantly countercyclical suggesting that those sectors are less desirable. These findings are consistent with those from the mutinomial logit of countercyclical movements from informal salaried work into unemployed status. Rather than a sector of last resort, movements into informal salaried work seem to be procyclical while workers leave the sector during recession, perhaps because distressed informal enterprises cannot keep them on or their families urge them to seek outside sources of income.
Movements from the upper tier of formal salaried employment into contract work, appear largely procyclical and again there appears evidence of queuing to enter the sector. For poorer formal sector workers, however, the sector may serve as safety net although the effect never appears significantly in the POBP regressions.
This finding of formal sector workers being rationed out of both the informal salaried and contract sectors, is highly counterintuitive. But it may be that in an overall downturn, it the lower tier of self-employment absorbs the unemployed, but that good apprenticeships in informal enterprises, or contracts with larger firms become more scarce. Notes: Worker transitions among sectors across five quarter period using overlapping panels from 1987-1993, Mexican National Survey of Unemployment.
Unem is average unemplyment rate across period. Standard Errors in (), *= significant at 10%, ** at 5%. Standard Errors in (), *= significant at 10%, ** at 5%. 
